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The process of adaption—in the old idiom from page to stage—is the 
object of much current scholarship. With the rise of "new journalism,, 
and "popular history," new problems have occurred. That the most 
popular contemporary medium is television, with its well-documented 
limitations, complicates the problem further: whether by accident or 
design, popular conceptions of historical events will be shaped by 
such dramatizations. Although producers have usually been responsible 
if not always accurate, the reputation of at least one American president 
has been affected by a series of unconnected television productions. From 
Plain Speaking and Give 'em Hell, Harry through Collision Course and 
Man of Independence to Meeting at Potsdam, coupled with a harvest 
of books and other material, the popular appraisal of Harry S. Truman 
is being significantly reshaped. 
Why Truman? If one reflects upon the presidents and other political 
figures of twentieth century America, it is clear that the dramatic potential 
of most is either slight or quickly exhausted. Wilson's idealism has been 
amply documented; Roosevelt may have been our strongest president but 
the theatricality of his tenure seems restricted to the soap opera of his 
love life. Kennedy's image is massive, but The Missiles of October just 
about covers his significant moment (it would mark a new direction if 
someone would dramatize the Bay of Pigs!). Johnson and Nixon? Popu-
lar history craves winners, not losers. Teddy Roosevelt offers great poten-
tial, but his causes are those of an earlier generation. But Truman—not 
only does he belong to our time, but his was a key hand in shaping the 
world we live in. Add to that the Horatio Alger aspects of his career as a 
semi-educated Missouri haberdasher (a point the image-makers capitalize 
on) unexpectedly thrust into the presidency of the United States, and 
you have the stuff of legends. Indeed, the parallels between Truman and 
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Abraham Lincoln, the most dramatized and mythicized figure in Amer-
ican history, are significant: honest, unpolished midwesterners, cutting 
through the artifice of political idiom with epigrammatic country wit, 
thrust by circumstance into moments of great crisis—a nation divided, a 
world divided—vilified in their own time, but in retrospect dominant 
figures on the stage of history. In the disillusioned 1970s, scarred by 
Watergate, mistrustful of politicians, perhaps the nation craves a simple, 
direct "Give 'em Hell, Harry" leader. Forgotten is his immense unpopu-
larity; remembered are his acceptance of the buck, his outspoken candor, 
his unsophisticated honesty. 
Meeting at Potsdam1 deals with what has traditionally been considered 
the least significant of the wartime summit conferences—Churchill, Stalin 
and Truman meeting in Germany purportedly to settle some European 
questions in advance of a global peace conference. 
The image-makers have seized upon Truman with great enthusiasm; 
the danger in this is not that Truman was not the things they say he was, 
but that we are ending up with another larger-than-life caricature instead 
of flesh and blood. Adding to the problems of adaption is that the film 
is based upon a controversial reinterpretation of history of the same title 
by a writer of popular history named Charles Mee.2 The focus of this 
review, however, is the television adaption, its relationship to histor-
ical fact and its contribution to the Truman legend. 
The format of this motion picture, commonly found in dramatizations 
of popular history, is composed of documentary, drama and a potpourri 
of cinematic techniques. The drama is more successful than the docu-
mentary, in this case. In an apparent attempt at realism, an objective-
sounding narrator comments on newsreel footage presented on a small 
screen behind him. Another commentator with a Russian accent and a 
pert young Wren discuss the preparations for the conference, and a 
thumbnail sketch of Potsdam, "the Hollywood of Germany," and the 
Cecilienhof Palace introduces the drama itself. If these harmless but 
gratuitous touches are intended to create an atmosphere of verisimilitude, 
they succeed only superficially—Russians speaking English with Russian 
accents, official-sounding commentators and a disclaimer at the beginning 
admitting that "not all historians agree with this interpretation." The 
narrator, of course, pops back in to make summary—and highly debatable 
—remarks about the action. 
Certainly the strong point of the production is the casting, and much 
effort is expended to develop the characters of the three main participants. 
Jose Ferrer's Stalin is the most traditional portrait, resplendent in white 
uniform and bushy moustache. He is his shrewd, elusive self: at times 
straightforward and charming—"I like him," says Truman—at other 
times shrouded in mystery—"I think he's an SOB," says Truman. Church-
ill, on the other hand, is characterized as a sick, tedious old man 
grasping for the straws of an empire. John Houseman is a masterful 
actor who makes the viewer forget that no one could look like the real 
Churchill, but the film follows Mee's lead in constructing a devious 
individual—"ceaselessly nit-picked on trivial points," "downright rude to 
his assistants," "loquaciousness," "boorishness"—who is trying to pit 
Russia against the United States to rescue a few crumbs for Great Britain. 
The most interesting and important character is, of course, Truman 
(played by Ed Flanders). He is introduced by the narrator as an unknown 
quantity—"ex-senator, ex-haberdasher," an inexperienced diplomat but 
"the best poker player this side of Missouri." With the latter statement, 
100 
the central motif and metaphor of the film is established. Not only do the 
nightly poker games serve as a device for exposition of the background, 
motives and characteristics of the representatives at the conference, but 
also as a microcosm of the global poker game going on at the same time. 
Again and again, we are reminded of Truman's familiarity with the poker 
table, if not the negotiating table, and the film suggests, the differences 
are not so great. The President exhibits those traits so valuable at poker— 
estimating one's opponents, knowing when to bluff and how to play a 
pat hand. This metaphor is obviously useful to the film makers, but the 
device is also dangerous in that it portrays Truman as more confident 
and assertive than other sources suggest that he was, and it oversimplifies 
the postwar situation. However analogous poker and international nego-
tiations may be, they are not the same thing. Being a shrewd poker 
player is an appealing asset but hardly the only talent necessary to decide 
the future of the world. 
There are other characters, but little is made of them. The most 
interesting of them are Barry Morse's James Byrnes, southern and skillful 
in negotiations in contrast with the man who took the vice-presidency 
from him, and Henry Stimson, ex officio diplomat of another time, who 
brings the word that the bomb has worked. Stimson, too, serves in con-
trast with Truman. He remembers when dinner with the president meant 
black tie and advances the theory that "the bridge players have given way 
to the poker players." Byrnes and Stimson are also contrasted with Tru-
man on the matter of the bomb. Stimson is opposed to using it; Byrnes 
suggests dropping it in the water as a warning. 
In other areas, the film is not so dramatically successful. It makes use 
of only the first and final parts of Mee's book, ignoring the plenary ses-
sions in the middle. The film makers are obviously more concerned with 
characters and conflicts. Despite these liberties, however, the cinematic 
techniques are hackneyed and the dramatic structure sputters to a con-
trived conclusion. Devices such as a quick cut to the test bomb going off 
in New Mexico or a five second cut of the Enola Gay en route are appar-
ently intended to quicken the hearts of the audience in preparation for 
Truman's world-shaking decision. But, instead, they seem artificial and 
out of place. Moreover, the bomb is only one of several climactic moments 
we are prepared for in the early going, but it eventually overshadows 
everything else at the conference. In fact, two threads of the story which 
are made much of are never resolved—Stalin's request for part of the 
German fleet and the effect of Churchill's election loss upon the other 
conferees. Even the major questions of western Europe, spheres of 
influence, and so on, are dispensed with in a short scene where Truman 
and Stalin "divide up the world." Not only does the approach seem 
simplistic; it is not well-constructed drama. 
The Potsdam Conference, unless one accepts the position of Mee, 
contained little of the momentousness and significance attributed to its 
predecessor at Yalta. The film's method of picking and choosing from 
various historical sources fails to convey a complete view of history. Like 
the book, it does not develop the complex issues and forces playing upon 
the instrumental members of the conference.3 What emerges, erroneously, 
is a picture of the three most powerful men in the world sitting down to 
a game of diplomatic poker, each trying to bluff the others and gain the 
upper hand for his nation. 
In the prologue to his book, Mee expresses the basic theme which 
carries over into the film. After listing the numerous interpretations of 
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what occurred at Potsdam, Mee dismisses them for depending on the 
assumption that the conference involved men overwhelmed by forces 
beyond their control. The evidence, he states, will not support the "com-
forting view of good intentions thwarted by irresistible forces/' 
Instead, the conference exhibits three men who were intent 
upon increasing the power of their countries and of them-
selves and who perceived that they could enhance their 
power more certainly in a world of discord than of tran-
quillity. . . . How they rescued discord from the threatened 
outbreak of peace is the story of this book.4 
This specious and dramatically inspired contention is brought out clearly 
in the film. However, such a thesis-ridden approach ignores the fact that, 
powerful leaders though they may have been, they were functioning in a 
world of chaos where the future was in doubt, where the decisions of the 
past had to be observed and where the war against Japan was unresolved 
—a situation which no one could manipulate as easily as Mee argues. 
The film's portrayal of Truman is also questionable. On the one 
hand, he is the unseasoned country boy and accidental president, and on 
the other, he is a shrewd diplomat with clearly defined motives and 
goals, the most important of which is to keep the Russians out of the 
Pacific. Mee argues, and the film implies, that Truman had come to the 
conference already decided that there was no need for Russian participa-
tion in the war with Japan, that there would be no peace conference even 
though he intentionally refers topics to it during the plenary sessions 
and that he had already decided to use the new bomb—not just as a 
military weapon to bring the Japanese to unconditional surrender but 
also as a political one to keep the Russians in line. 
To dramatize the proceedings, the movie skirts the major issues at the 
conference—the reparations from Germany, the Polish government and 
territorial demands, the disposition of Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, and 
Italy—and uses them as minor instances of the give and take, developing 
tensions of the conference. These issues are left unresolved, with little 
recognition given to their ultimate importance in the cold war, and with 
little or no reference to their final disposition. Only toward the end do 
we get the brief scene representing Truman and Stalin dividing the map 
of Europe into two spheres. 
Apparently for dramatic reasons, then, the film centers upon two 
tangential matters rather than those issues which were directly a part of 
the conference—the atomic bomb and the fate of Japan and the role of 
the Russians in determining this fate. The initial poker game prepares 
us for this shift in emphasis. We encounter the shrewd, manipulative 
Truman for the first time. He says that he has better things to do than 
attend this conference, but he postulates that the overriding purpose of 
the meeting is to show himself to Churchill and Stalin—to let them decide 
whether they should keep their hands in their pockets when he was around 
or whether he was "some jackass [they] can lead around by the nose." 
Truman is portrayed as sure of what he is doing and where he is going. 
Undoubtedly, the picture exaggerates his astuteness. One of the poker 
players, General Harry Vaughan (described by Mee as one of the Presi-
dent's intimates),5 has expressed in an oral interview at the Truman 
Library that Truman was unsure of himself and was feeling his way 
among the new and difficult situations at Potsdam.6 The picture which 
emerges from his cronies and his advisors is of a man who sought advice 
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and absorbed what was necessary, but who was haunted by the legacy of 
Roosevelt and had not yet found his way in international diplomacy.7 
In the film, however, it is a different Truman who can confidently 
say "now we know what we are doing here" when he decides to keep 
Russia out of the Pacific, and who can with Machiavellian clarity define a 
peace conference as "a bunch of little guys screaming for their rights and 
trying to tell the big guys what to do." Although planning a peace con-
ference is on the agenda, Truman confides that there is going to be no 
peace conference and that the U.S. is only going "to make a show of it." 
This interpretation takes liberties with actual American intentions and 
attributes too much deviousness to Truman. 
In reality, the futility of a peace conference did not emerge until 
almost a year later.8 Until then, the American position was to have the 
foreign ministers meet to make the vital decisions—dominated by the 
major powers. Then a conference of all nations would be called to ratify 
those decisions. The intent was to avoid the chaos of the Versailles con-
ference that followed World War I.9 Truman altered his plans because 
the world situation changed drastically in the next year. This is far 
different from the movie's suggestion that Truman's statements about 
the peace conference were just another poker move—saying one thing 
but meaning another. 
The portrait of Truman's shrewd diplomacy and skillful use of power 
is further developed when the news of the atomic bomb arrives. With 
this comforting knowledge, he has his "ace in the hole" and knows what 
he can do with it. From the film's point of view, everything else at the 
conference became secondary as Truman seizes upon the bomb's political 
advantages.10 In the tradition of revisionist historians, Truman is por-
trayed as never doubting for an instant that the bomb will be used. Not 
only will it bring imperial Japan to its knees but, more importantly, it 
will keep Russia out of the Pacific. In a revealing scene, Truman mimics 
the Russians in explaining why the bomb must be dropped on Japan. 
America must prove to Russia that it means business, that the bomb will 
not be used simply to kill fish. Truman is shown as a man a step ahead 
of his advisors who, with the exception of General Marshall, are opposed 
to using it. 
The film even implies that Truman was playing only a power game, 
that the bomb was not needed to end the war. Like a good poker player, 
he was exploiting his advantage to the limit. Use the bomb as a bluff to 
control the Russians in Europe and deny them the Pacific. Exciting and 
dramatic as this concept may be, the film fails to examine the complex 
and sometimes terrifying alternatives to this decision. With conventional 
bombing, a naval blockade, or armed invasion, many thousands of Amer-
ican lives would be lost. Estimates varied as to how long the Japanese 
could hold out. Everyone knew they would lose, but many lives would 
be lost along the way.11 In a point never even suggested in the film, 
Churchill and others pointed out that the bomb would not only save 
American lives but those of many Japanese civilians as well.12 Finally, 
the effectiveness of the bomb was still in doubt: certainly no one could 
clearly predict the actual results.13 
Another idea suggested by both Mee and the film is that the Potsdam 
Proclamation, which called for Japan's unconditional surrender—contrary 
to the advice of many—was not a mistake in judgment but another in-
stance of the clever Truman at work. If the Japanese refused to surrender 
unconditionally, which he assumed would happen if they could not retain 
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their emperor, then the bomb could be used and Russia would be shut 
out of the war. Again, this is a simplified interpretation which ignores 
that the American people demanded unconditional surrender and would 
have considered anything else appeasement.14 Furthermore, Barton Bern-
stein, reviewing Mee's book in Political Science Quarterly, argues that if 
Truman had really wanted to do what the movie suggests—keep the Rus-
sians out of the Pacific—the logical thing to do would have been to delete 
the unconditional surrender clause and give Japan a chance to quit before 
the Russians could mobilize.15 But he did not do this. Another thing the 
film ignores is that the military still controlled Japan. Perhaps, had the 
U.S. compromised, it would have shown weakness and strengthened 
To jo's resolve to fight.16 
Reading the situation realistically, one sees Truman not as a man 
manipulating events but as a man trying to do what was right. Faced with 
the need to preserve faith in the allied coalition, Truman struggled with 
the question of revealing the bomb to the Soviets. If he told them, they 
could hurry their efforts to enter the war; if he followed Churchill's 
advice and told them nothing, he would be responsible for a breach of 
faith on the part of the allied cause. Truman decided to resolve the 
dilemma by telling Stalin casually after a plenary session on July 24. With 
typical heavy-handedness, the narrator calls this moment the beginning of 
the ''twentieth century's nuclear arms race." Today it is clear that the 
Russians already knew about the bomb (although the film shows Stalin 
and Molotov in an agitated conversation in Russian). And according to 
Charles Bohlen, Truman's interpreter at the session, Russia was already 
prepared to enter the war. The bomb only triggered their declaration.17 
The film's emphasis on drama leads to a superficial and hasty conclu-
sion. After showing a jaunty Truman returning home on the Augusta 
and a sick and defeated Churchill in England, the film implies that the 
British are finished and that Truman and Stalin have divided the world 
as easily as drawing a colored line on a map—America conceding eastern 
Europe but keeping western Europe. The narrator concludes the pre-
sentation with the simplistic notion that Stalin, his fears about western 
duplicity confirmed, went back to Moscow and lowered the "iron curtain." 
No turning point in history can be so clearly and easily defined, and 
the Potsdam Conference was certainly not the climax that the film sug-
gests. Much of what happened there was the culmination of previous 
events, especially the Yalta Conference. Much of what is suggested in the 
film about Truman's intentional actions is exaggerated. And only after 
the problems and crises of the Potsdam Conference were played out in the 
ensuing months was the "iron curtain" dropped. Only after the foreign 
ministers' meetings ended in confrontation and the conflicting interests 
of the U.S. and the Soviet Union became clear did the things attributed to 
Potsdam become fact. The cold war's origins are too complex to pass off 
simply as the result of a few powerful men determined to increase the 
power of their nations. Of course it is easier and more dramatic to show 
the course of history as changed at climactic moments by men of great 
will and determination, but, in reality, Potsdam must be understood as a 
lesser conference with men reacting to the forces of history. 
The question, finally, is how much latitude an author or a film maker 
is to be allowed in adapting historical events for popular appeal. Con-
trary to the opinions of some professional historians, popular history has 
justification in that it dramatizes and attempts to explain to the masses 
the events and decisions that shaped their lives. Television has vastly 
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enlarged the audience for popular history. But there is a burden of 
responsibility which the adapter must accept. He may simplify. He may 
telescope events. He may shift emphases to achieve dramatic climax. But 
he may not distort the facts, make a completely unjustified interpretation, 
ignore significant sources, or sacrifice accuracy to advance a particular 
point of view or aggrandize a political figure. 
Meeting at Potsdam fails to observe most of the latter requirements. 
In their desire for drama and mass appeal, the film makers have based 
their production on a controversial and limited popular interpretation— 
one which has the superficial dramatic potential they seem to crave. To 
achieve dramatic conflict they have significantly distorted the characters 
and motives of historical figures. To build the actions to a dramatic 
climax they have modified the actual details preceding the decision to 
use the atomic bomb, and to achieve their ends they have used historical 
materials which furthered their thesis and ignored those which did not. 
Truman could have been dramatized as an inexperienced president with 
human failings who handled a difficult situation well, but the film makers 
have made him less, ironically by attempting to make him more. 
In discussing the demands of television, Edwin Newman observed that 
"drama demands pace, texture, and action."18 In its lust for these things, 
this particular entry in the Truman-cult sweepstakes, Meeting at Potsdam, 
sacrifies accuracy and depth and leaves misapprehension in the viewers' 
minds. 
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